Why unlawful data processing is not enough: the evidential burden of proving burden of enforcing right to privacy in Nigeria.
Abstract
In Incorporated Trustees of Data Privacy Lawyers Association v Truecaller International LLP, the High Court of Lagos State held that the right to privacy under section 37 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) (Constitution) extends to personal data; that an association may sue for non-user members under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009 (FREP Rules); that Truecaller acted as both data controller and data processor; and that its users’ acceptance of its terms did not establish non-users’ consent to the processing of their telephone numbers. The court nevertheless dismissed the application because the applicants had not proved infringement by cogent and credible evidence. This article examines the decision against the Constitution, the Nigeria Data Protection Act 2023 (NDPA), the Nigeria Data Protection Act General Application and Implementation Directive 2025 (GAID) and the FREP Rules. It argues that the case is best read as a lesson in evidence: a controller’s failure to show a lawful basis does not by itself prove that a particular applicant’s right was infringed. It also argues that the court’s remark that misappropriating personal information without economic harm is neither damage nor injury should not be treated as a general rule.
1. Introduction
Truecaller is a caller-identification and spam-blocking application. According to its affidavit evidence, a user who activates an optional “Enhanced Search” feature uploads contacts from the phone’s address book to servers in India, so the numbers of people who never registered can enter its database.[1] The Data Privacy Lawyers Association (DPLA), suing for non-user members, and two individuals sought declarations, injunctions and damages of N200 million (general) and N100 million (exemplary).[2]
On 14 September 2026, Ojuromi J decided most contested legal questions for the applicants but dismissed the application. The case therefore poses a practical question: what must an applicant prove, beyond the absence of a lawful basis, to obtain relief under the Constitution?
2. The Legal Framework
The Constitution. Section 37 protects the privacy of citizens, their homes, correspondence, telephone conversations and telegraphic communications. Following Incorporated Trustees of Digital Rights Lawyers Initiative v National Identity Management Commission, the court held that the privacy of citizens includes the protection of personal information, communications and data.[3] Section 45(1) permits laws reasonably justifiable in a democratic society to derogate from section 37, but the court stressed that it validates such laws and gives controllers no free pass to process data without a lawful basis.[4] Article 23(2) of GAID, 2025 is to the same effect: no instrument authorises processing without compliance with sections 37 and 45.[5]
The NDPA. Section 25(1) lists the lawful bases: consent, or necessity for a contract, a legal obligation, vital interests, a public-interest task or legitimate interests. Section 25(2) denies the label “legitimate” to interests that override the data subject’s fundamental rights or defeat reasonable expectations. Section 26(1) places the burden of proving consent on the controller. Section 65 defines consent as a freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication, which may be given on behalf of another individual who has permitted it.[6]
The FREP Rules. Made under section 46(3) of the Constitution, the Rules allow any person alleging infringement to apply in the State where it occurs (Order II r 1), supported by a statement of reliefs and grounds and an affidavit of facts (Order II r 3). Paragraph 3(e) of the Preamble welcomes public-interest litigation, bars dismissal for want of locus standi and lets associations sue for potential applicants, while paragraph 3(a) requires Chapter IV to be interpreted expansively. Order XI empowers the court to make such orders as it considers just to enforce the right.
3. What the Applicants Won
Jurisdiction. Truecaller said it has no office, staff or server in Nigeria and that any infringement occurred in India. The court held that it had jurisdiction because the second applicant lives, and the association has its office, in Lagos State.[7]
Standing. Reading “any person” in section 46(1) of the Constitution as including the plural, and relying on the Preamble, the court held that the association could sue for non-user members. Not listing their names and numbers did not defeat the application.[8]
Controller and processor. Truecaller argued that its users were the controllers. The court found that Truecaller has its own purposes for users’ and non-users’ numbers, notably its public safety function, and held that it acts as both controller and processor.[9]
Consent. The court accepted that the section 65 definition can reach information held by a user who has permission to consent. But Truecaller cited no authority, and showed nothing beyond its terms of service and privacy policy, to establish that users had that permission or that non-users had consented. Accepting implied consent, the court said, would eviscerate the privacy rule and the statutory definition.[10] It added that legitimate interest under section 25(1)(b)(v) is limited by the data subject’s fundamental rights.[11] It made no express finding on the other bases Truecaller invoked, however, and described public safety as a matter of the utmost importance.
4. Why the Application Failed
The court applied Oando Plc v Farmatic Biogas West Africa Ltd: an applicant alleging breach of a Chapter IV right bears the initial burden of proving it with cogent and credible evidence, and general allegations will not do. It extended that rule to section 37.[12] The applicants’ affidavit listed exposure, loss of control, distress, risk of misuse and identity theft, and lack of transparency. The court treated these as allegations, not proved facts.
The judgment records that Truecaller deleted the applicants’ numbers on request. The court also asked whether privacy can be said to have been breached where the number is already known to the searching user, since the number-for-name search requires the searcher to have the number. Finally, it observed that misappropriation of personal information, without resulting economic harm, is “neither damage nor injury”, and concluded that infringement was not proved.[13]
5. Assessment
Lawfulness is not infringement. The court rejected implied non-user consent yet dismissed the application. That outcome makes sense only if lawfulness of processing is one question and proof that these applicants’ rights were infringed is another. The affidavit’s proof of processing rested on a vendor’s message and a screenshot of it, and Truecaller stressed that no numbers were supplied for the non-user members or the third applicant.
The damage observation. It follows the court’s reference to the section 65 definition of personal data breach, which concerns breaches of security. The applicants’ complaint was different: collection and use without a lawful basis. Neither section 37 nor the FREP Rules expressly makes economic loss a condition of a declaration that a right has been infringed, and the Preamble requires expansive interpretation of Chapter IV. Damages are different. Compensation may well require proof of loss, and the applicants claimed N300 million in general and exemplary damages without quantifying any. The observation is safest read as a comment on damages and part of the proof failure, not as a rule that privacy infringement requires financial loss.
Public availability. Section 25 lists no lawful basis of public availability. How a number became known may bear on harm and causation, but it does not justify later collection.
6. Practical Lessons
For litigators
- Identify the data. Name the applicants, exhibit their own numbers and prove that each was processed, using screenshots, search results, correspondence and an explanation of how the platform works.
- Prove each harm pleaded. Link exposure and distress to specific events, such as unsolicited approaches, instead of listing them generically.
- Address public availability. If the defendant says the number is already public or known to the searcher, show how its database changes who can link the number to a name.
- Match relief to evidence. Declarations, injunctions and damages turn on different proof. If the controller has already deleted the data, explain why prospective relief is still needed.
- Consider the regulator. GAID art 39 addresses the right to complain to the Nigeria Data Protection Commission, and art 23(1)(c) recognises both Part 10 of the NDPA and the FREP Rules as avenues of redress.[14]
For technology businesses. A registered user’s acceptance of terms is not evidence that non-users consented, and the controller must prove consent. Roles turn on function: the court rejected Truecaller’s attempt to cast its users as controllers. Legitimate-interest and public-interest bases require evidence of necessity and proportionality under GAID art 23(1) and are bounded by section 25(2). The jurisdiction ruling turned on where the applicants live, not on the territorial reach of the NDPA, which GAID art 1(2) ties to section 2(c) for controllers outside Nigeria who process the data of subjects in Nigeria.[15]
7. Conclusion
DPLA v Truecaller establishes helpful propositions: section 37 of the Constitution protects personal data, associations may sue for non-user members, and a platform cannot treat its users’ agreement as non-users’ consent. These findings do not carry applicants to relief unless the evidence ties the processing to each applicant. Applicants must establish the connection between their personal data and the impugned processing, demonstrate the unlawful interference with their privacy rights and provide evidence of consequential harm where damages are sought. The observation on economic harm deserves appellate scrutiny before it hardens into a rule that neither the Constitution nor the FREP Rules states.
Notes
- Incorporated Trustees of Data Privacy Lawyers Association v Truecaller International LLP (High Court of Lagos State, Eti-Osa Judicial Division, Suit No LD/2021MFHR/2025, 14 September 2026) (Ojuromi J) (DPLA v Truecaller).
- ibid.
- Incorporated Trustees of Digital Rights Lawyers Initiative v National Identity Management Commission (2021) LPELR-55623(CA), applied in DPLA v Truecaller (n 1); see also Emerging Markets Telecommunications Services Ltd v Eneye (2018) LPELR-46193(CA).
- DPLA v Truecaller (n 1); Constitution, s 45(1).
- GAID, art 23(2).
- NDPA, ss 25, 26(1) and 65, as quoted in DPLA v Truecaller (n 1).
- DPLA v Truecaller (n 1); FREP Rules, Order II r 1; Atoyebi v Barclays Bank Plc (2026) 10 NWLR (Pt 2049) 377, cited in the judgment.
- DPLA v Truecaller (n 1); Constitution, s 46(1); FREP Rules, Preamble, para 3(e).
- DPLA v Truecaller (n 1); NDPA, Section 65.
- DPLA v Truecaller (n 1); NDPA, ss 26(1) and 65.
- NDPA, s 25(1)(b)(v) and (2).
- Oando Plc v Farmatic Biogas West Africa Ltd (2018) LPELR-45564(CA), applied in DPLA v Truecaller (n 1).
- DPLA v Truecaller (n 1); NDPA, s 65 (personal data breach).
- GAID, arts 23(1)(c) and 39.
- GAID, art 1(2); NDPA, s 2(c).






